Showing posts with label Finance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Finance. Show all posts

Monday, March 28, 2011

Asset Valuation in Finance

There are nine theories and ten methods for valuation. The valuation of any asset is a highly subjective one and depends on hosts of factors, some beyond the control of buyer or seller. This picture captures some of the essence of valuation.

Valuation

The nine theories are

  1. Fernandez (2007) assumes that the company will have a constant debt-to-equity ratio in book value terms. In this scenario, the risk of the increases of debt is equal to the risk of the free cash flow.
  2. Miles and Ezzell (1980) assume that the company will have a constant D/E ratio in market value terms: the correct discount rate for the tax shield (D Kd T) is Kd for the first year, and Ku for the following years.
  3. Modigliani and Miller (1963) assume that the amount of debt of every future year is known today and discount the tax savings due to interest payments at the risk-free rate (RF).
  4. Myers (1974) makes assumptions similar to those of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and discounts the tax savings due to interest payments at the required return to debt (Kd).
  5. Miller (1977) concludes that the leverage-driven value creation or value of the tax shields is zero.
  6. Harris and Pringle (1985) and Ruback (1995) discount the tax shields at the required return to the unlevered equity (Ku). According to them, the value of tax shields (VTS) is VTS = PV[D Kd T ; Ku].
  7. Damodaran (1994). To introduce leverage costs, Damodaran assumes that the relationship between the levered and unlevered beta is:  βL = βu + D (1-T) βu / E (Instead of the relationship obtained in Fernandez (2007), βL = βu + D (1-T) (βu - βd) / E).
  8. Practitioners method. To introduce higher leverage costs, this method assumes that the relationship between the levered and unlevered beta is: βL = βu + D βu / E.
  9. With-cost-of leverage. This theory assumes that the cost of leverage is the present value of the interest differential that the company pays over the risk-free rate.

The ten methods are

  1. equity cash flows discounted at the required return to equity;
  2. free cash flow discounted at the WACC;
  3. capital cash flows discounted at the WACC before tax;
  4. APV (Adjusted Present Value);
  5. the business’s risk-adjusted free cash flows discounted at the required return to assets;
  6. the business’s risk-adjusted equity cash flows discounted at the required return to assets;
  7. economic profit discounted at the required return to equity;
  8. EVA discounted at the WACC;
  9. the risk-free rate-adjusted free cash flows discounted at the risk-free rate; and
  10. the risk-free rate-adjusted equity cash flows discounted at the required return to assets.

But valuation of asset is a highly subjective. There can never be generalizations. Value depends on the

  1. Demand and supply
  2. Urgency to buy or sell
  3. Behavior of seller and buyer
  4. One’s forecast of future events
  5. One’s future planning
  6. Cash flows and discount rates

Monday, March 21, 2011

Impact of Debt Financing on EBIT of Firm–Introduction Part 1

In finance, capital structure refers to the way a corporation finances its assets. A firm can be financed by 100% equity or with some mix of equity and debt. It is an important decision, how the assets of a firm are financed i-e what should be the financing mix? Should the firm be financed with 100 equity or with some mix of equity and debt? The finance literature on the subject of capital structure is extensive but yet to come up to any definite answer.

Equity in finance is defined as the residual claim or interest of the most junior class of investors in assets, after all liabilities are paid. Debt imply intent to pay a fixed periodic payment and pay back an amount owed by a specific date, which is set forth in the repayment terms. It has a claim ahead of equity on the earnings of the firm.

Does capital structure choice of a firm matter? In financial literature related to the question of financing mix of a firm, we find five major strands of research viz.

  1. Tax Based Theories
  2. Agency Costs Theories
  3. Signaling Theories
  4. Pecking Order Theories
  5. Information Asymmetry Theories

 Modigliani Miller (1958) argued that under certain assumptions value of the firm is independent of how its assets are financed i-e its capital structure. Later in (1963) they revised their famous MM proposition by saying that the existence of tax subsidies on interest payments would cause the value of the firm to rise with the amount of debt financing by the amount of the capitalized value of the tax subsidy. For value of the firm to increase in case of debt financing because of larger cash inflows due to tax subsidy is only possible when EBIT of the firm remains the same no matter how the assets are financed. So, essentially they argued that EBIT of the firm would be independent no matter how the capital is divided among equity and debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. If the behavior of the firm is “the outcome of complex equilibrium process” – balancing act of value maximization of different stakeholders given the positive monitoring and bonding costs then it cannot be said that its operations are independent of its choice of capital structure. They further argued that Modigliani-Miller theorem is based on the assumption that the probability distribution of the cash flows to the firm is independent of the capital structure. It is now recognized that the existence of positive costs associated with bankruptcy and the presence of tax subsidies on corporate interest payments will invalidate this irrelevance theorem precisely because the probability distribution of future cash flows changes as the probability of the incurrence of the bankruptcy costs changes, i.e., as the ratio of debt to equity rises. The existence of agency costs provide stronger reasons for arguing that the probability distribution of future cash flows is not independent of the capital or ownership structure. They went on to assert that debt carries covenants that limit management’s ability to take optimal actions on certain issues and that would reduce the profitability of the firm. In general the revenues or the operating costs of the firm are not independent of the probability of bankruptcy and thus the capital structure of the firm. As the probability of bankruptcy increases, both the operating costs and the revenues of the firm are adversely affected, therefore, its EBIT of the firm cannot be independent of how it is financed. Stephen A. Ross (1977) advocated that implicit in the irrelevancy proposition is the assumption that the market knows the (random) return stream of the firm and values this stream to set the value of the firm. What is valued in the marketplace, however, is the perceived stream of returns for the firm. Putting the issue this way raises the possibility that changes in the financial structure can alter the market's perception. Value of a firm will rise in case of debt financing because it will signal to the market that EBIT of the firm would be sufficient enough to meet its obligations. The reason was that any change in financial structure of the firm changes its perception in the market about its earnings stream and when leverage is increased, it is perceived in the market that the firm has expectations of strong earnings stream. So, in his opinion, if the firm decides to finance future expansion or change its financial structure with debt, it is because that firm expects a strong earnings stream and so the value of the firm would increase. Stewart C. Myers (1984) argued that optimal debt ratio in capital structure is determined by tradeoff of benefits and costs of debt financing by holding constant the firm’s assets and investment plans. Benefits of debt are interest tax shields whereas costs include various costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. If there were no adjustment costs then each firm’s debt-to-value ratio should be its optimal ratio. But there are adjustment costs and time lag as the firms move toward their target debt ratio that is why there is observable dispersion in debt ratios in cross section of data. He cited a study by Donaldson (1961) that states “Management strongly favored internal generation as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external funds except for occasional unavoidable ‘bulges’ in the need for fund.” He further cited Donaldson “Given that external finance was needed, managers rarely thought of issuing stock.” This behavior of managers is due to asymmetric information and costs of financial distress. Because of asymmetry of information, managers are unwilling to issue equity if market undervalue new issue of equity. If the firm does seek external funds, it is better off issuing debt than equity securities. The general rule is, "Issue safe securities before risky ones." What if the managers' inside information is unfavorable, so that any risky security issue would be overpriced? In this case, wouldn't the firm want to make /\N as large as possible, to take maximum advantage of new investors? If so, stock would seem better than debt (and warrants better still). The decision rule seems to be, "Issue debt when investors undervalue the firm, and equity, or some other risky security, when they overvalue it.” If the manager with superior information acts to maximize the intrinsic value of existing shares, then the announcement of a stock issue should be bad news, other things equal, because stock issues will be more likely when the manager receives bad news. On the other hand, stock retirements should be good news. The news in both cases has no evident necessary connection with shifts in target debt ratios.It is assumed that EBIT of the firm is independent from source of financing. It does not matter as far as EBIT is concerned how the new investment opportunity is financed. It is a matter of perception in the market due to asymmetry of information that changes the value of the firm. Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984) argued that because of asymmetry of information new stockholders assume that  management acts in the interests of 'old' (existing) stockholders. If managers have inside information there must be some cases in which that information is so favorable that management, if it acts in the interest of the old stockholders, will refuse to issue shares even if it means passing up a good investment opportunity. That is, the cost to old shareholders of issuing shares at a bargain price may outweigh the project's NPV. Investors, aware of their relative ignorance, will reason that a decision not to issue shares signals 'good news'. The news conveyed by an issue is bad or at least less good. This affects the price investors are willing to pay for the issue, which in turn affects the issue-invest decision. Under these circumstances, a firm with ample financial slack - e.g., large holdings of cash or marketable securities, or the ability to issue default-risk-free debt - would take all positive-NPV opportunities. The same firm without slack would pass some up and if external financing is required will prefer debt to equity. This model also assumes that EBIT of a firm is independent of its choice of financing mix, it is the discount rate that varies with the perception of investors about a particular choice of financing mix.

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Commodity Speculation and Middle East Turmoil

Here is an excerpt about the subject

The short answer with regard to the role of speculation in the Middle East turmoil (and the spike in gas prices) is that speculation is obviously playing a large role. Everyone I’ve spoken to seems to think this is a virtual replay of 2008, only the larger spike here is in food commodity prices. Wheat and corn are both up more than 75% over the last 12 months; cotton is up over 125%; coffee up 85%. Meanwhile oil prices are soaring and there’s talk again of futures maybe hitting $200 a barrel – oil futures are trading at about three times what they were in February 2009. The blame for all of this is going to be laid at disruptions in the Middle East and other factors, but the inescapable fact is that commodity index speculation was up $80 billion last year, meaning that there was $80 billion of new money coming on the market betting on the rise of commodity prices. The total amount of commodity index speculation approached $400 billion last year, meaning the amount of speculative money on the market was roughly twenty times pre-2003 levels – and again, this is all “long-only” speculation, i.e. money betting on prices to go up. Obviously disasters and political unrest and other factors (a very weak harvest in Russia last year was a factor in the wheat price spike, for instance) play a part in all of this, but I think in the end what we’re going to find out is that index speculation was a huge factor in both the skyrocketing food prices that led to the Middle East crisis and this current oil-price situation.

Friday, March 11, 2011

Another Inside Story

Two films apart from the recently celebrated “Inside Job” show some glimpses how money is made in the Wall Street and these carry the same name Wall Street (1987) and Wall Street:Money Never Sleeps (2010).

Mario Puzo has rightly quoted at the start of his famous novel “The Godfather” that Behind every great fortune there is a crime. Great fortunes or huge wealth can not be achieved without usurpation.

Here is an excerpt from another such story

The vast investigation into insider trading on Wall Street that culminated this week in Raj Rajaratnam going on trial in New York accused of securities fraud was always likely to ensnare a large institution – perhaps a big hedge fund or a Wall Street bank. No one, however, expected the institution in question to be McKinsey & Co.

It was bad enough for the blue-chip management consultancy when Anil Kumar, one of its partners, admitted to supplying Mr Rajaratnam with inside information in return for bribes (Mr Rajaratnam denies all charges). But the Securities and Exchange Commission’s claim last week that Rajat Gupta, who was the head of McKinsey between 1994 and 2003, passed on tips as a board member of Goldman Sachs and Procter & Gamble, is a heavy blow.

It is hard to believe that trading on price-sensitive inside information from clients is rife inside the puritan, strait-laced firm – if evidence of that emerged, it would soon collapse, as Arthur Andersen did after Enron. But the accumulation and sharing of privileged knowledge is integral to how it works and it cannot afford its corporate and government clients to pull the shutters down.

Thomas Watson Jr, the former president of IBM, wrote in his autobiography Father, Son & Co of being asked by a company executive in 1956 whether he should share sensitive internal pricing information with a Booz Allen Hamilton consultant. “‘Sure,’ I said, ‘It’s like your doctor. You have to tell them everything.’”

The calculation every client makes is, in the words of Christopher McKenna, a professor at the Oxford university’s Saïd Business School who studies professional services firms, that “consultants will carry information in and information out. The client has to decide which of those flows is worth more.”

Indeed, one of the main reasons companies hire consultants is to make sure they do not fall behind what their competitors are doing – in return for parting with their own secrets, they gain access to their rivals’ suitably disguised “best practices”. The consultant is a broker who attempts to amass so much knowledge that each company has to hire him, no matter how uncomfortable that feels.

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Pakistan Economy and Loopholes

A balance of payment crisis compelled Pakistan to seek $11.3 billion IMF loan in 2008. Strings attached with the loan invited harsh criticism from the political parties and business groups. The three-point reform agenda requires implementation of reformed sales tax, reduction in budget deficit and end to government subsidies. At present, Pakistan is in a peculiar situation today. Fiscal deficit is high, debt is increasing rapidly, growth is minimal and unemployment on the rise. The mounting debt and liabilities, approaching Rs11,000 billion, doubling in the last three years, is being used for non-productive expenditure. The budget deficit is set to hit 7.5 percent against the targeted 4.7 percent for fiscal 2010/11 (July-June). Pakistan badly needs to generate additional revenue to meet its budgetary deficit and conditions agreed to IMF. That is why the Govt. is doing all what it can to win favors for RGST but still it looks a far cry. While the IMF forecasts emerging economies, notably China and India, to drive the global growth, Pakistan’s economic sovereignty is facing serious challenges. The debt profile of the country is worsening day by day with fears of a looming debt trap. With over half a billion debt increase in the first quarter of FY11, shared equally by domestic and foreign components, the country’s total debt reached Rs10.7 trillion. With fiscal deficit threatening to reach Rs1.5 billion for FY11, according to the Finmin, a significant rise in the country’s debt is inevitable.

But on the other hand there are many loopholes that if plugged can generate all the necessary revenue without resorting to increase in power tariff and RGST. One such case is “ISAF Missing Containers”.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan established by the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2001 by Resolution 1386 as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. It is engaged in the War in Afghanistan (2001–present).

ISAF started importing goods through Karachi and established Forward Mounting Base (FMB) unit at Karachi in 2002 as part of co-ordination mechanism by designating one of the its officers at Karachi to regularly co-ordinate customs clearance matters with Additional Collector Customs Karachi Port. But this co-ordination system fizzled out when the FMB was shifted by ISAF to Kabul within a year of its establishment at Karachi. In June 2010, it was leaked to media that over 11,000 ISAF containers with equipment worth Rs220 billion went missing during the last two years or so.

The FBR data showed that during the period June 2005-2010, a total of 558,141 containers were transited to Afghanistan. Of these, 166,949 (30 percent) containers belonged to the US Military; 52,929 (9 percent) to ISAF/Nato and the remaining 338,263 (61 percent) were commercial ATT consignments. The biggest aspect of the ISAF Containers Scam is the non-availability of the data on the movement of ISAF containers. The FTO report on the scam shows that in response to data requisitioned from FBR for the period January 1, 2007 to October 15, 2010, Pakistan Revenue Automation Limited (PRAL) confirmed that Karachi Customs had handled a total of 306,267 transit containers during this period. For 71,202 containers, there is no information regarding either their departure from Karachi or their arrival at the border customs stations. In case of 27,871 containers, that did arrive at the destinations, their departure information from Karachi is not available. Another 55,140 containers are shown to have left Karachi but have no entries of arrival at the border stations. A total of 152,054 containers have records for departure from Karachi and arrival at the border customs station, but no record of crossing into Afghanistan. Finally, not a single container, out of 306,267, is recorded to have ever crossed over to Afghanistan during the almost four-year period under reference. According to one informed insider, the arrival or otherwise of the ‘missing containers’ could be verified from the ISAF Kabul officials. The containers that were meant to go missing after availing of ISAF duty-tax free clearance by Customs were never meant to reach ISAF warehouses in Kabul and therefore the ISAF headquarters could easily confirm whether they ever arrived in Kabul or not.

It is estimated very conservatively that the scandal involving the ISAF containers have caused a huge loss of over Rs 37 billion to the economy. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary on Wednesday hearing the embezzlement of billions of rupees in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) containers case observed that revelations made in the Federal Tax Ombudsman report is just the tip of the iceberg, as further investigations could divulge much more. He said because of smuggling the national exchequer faces a loss of $2 billion every year.  The Chief Justice further said that even the Islamabad markets are flooded with the smuggled goods. Justice Ramday said that the domestic barrowing have reached Rs4008 billion since 2008 to 2010. The court wondered that besides the smuggling of alcohol and arms, what else is being smuggled on the pretext of Afghan trade.

The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) scam is bleeding our beleaguered economy dry to the tune of up to Rs37 billion per year . The ATTA allows goods destined for Afghanistan to transit through Pakistan duty free but ATTA goods, amounting to an estimated $2 billion, either stay in Pakistan or are smuggled back in. Described as the “main source of smuggling” in Pakistan, the ATTA scam is hemorrhaging our economy on several fronts. The ATTA has become an unmitigated source of customs duty evasion. When the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) enhances duties on any product, official imports to Pakistan decline as people shift to import the same product, fraudulently, under the ATTA. Such was the case with stainless steel imports, which doubled under ATTA within six months, immediately after duties were increased on it. So the ATTA has dented the FBR authorities’ ability to accrue revenue via customs duties which, when combined with the stranglehold of the feudal and political classes on preventing income tax collection, has stymied Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio to an eye-watering nine per cent. This is a critical issue for the nation’s economic future. The extent of the problem with ATTA is borne out by the fact that Afghanistan’s per capita imports are 72 per cent higher than Pakistan, even though its GDP per capita is almost 300 per cent lower. The statistics reveal the extent of smuggling into Pakistan. The Afghan economy cannot sustain such high imports. In fact, 80 per cent of these goods are smuggled into Pakistan, damaging local industry and destroying legal businesses here. Worse still, Pakistan’s high-value edibles are smuggled into Afghanistan, bleeding our exchequer further, as both fertilizers and flour are heavily subsidized by the government. The resultant shortage in Pakistan drives up prices — another body blow for the Pakistani people, already bludgeoned by food inflation.

Revenue loss on account of smuggling of Afghan transit trade alone, as estimated by the World Bank, amounted to US$ 35 billion during nine years from 2001 to 2009. It is no secret that Pakistani tax evaders have been transferring to Swiss banks huge amounts of money generated through illegal activities by some politicians, bureaucrats, terrorist networks and businessmen to Swiss banks. White-collar crimes are also responsible for facilitating transfer of capital towards informal economy either from the black market or the formal economy with the connivance of FRB’s officials. Due to Pakistan’s low productivity resulting from massive exemptions, poor administration, low threshold, and lack of transparency and enforcement, the country faces a massive challenge of balancing low revenues and the avaricious politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, and greedy businessmen, who are mostly crook, corrupt and tax evaders, succeed to remit this black money to their hidden accounts in Switzerland and other European countries. On the one hand parallel economy in Pakistan is growing at an alarming rate of 20 percent per annum and on the other hand, according to an estimate, the money lying in Swiss banks of Pakistanis has reached to the tune of US $200 billion. The volume of black money generated in the year 2008-09 alone has been measured by the independent sources which is not less than $ 40 billion. The rent-seekers and beneficiaries of loan write-offs in Pakistan have also shifted funds worth billions of dollars to Switzerland.

Monday, February 14, 2011

What caused food inflation?

In 2008, the government pushed the procurement price of wheat up from Rs. 625 per 40 kg to Rs. 950 per 40 kg. This action immediately triggered inflationary pressures that have continued to persist as food accounts for just over 40% of Pakistan's consumer price index. According to State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) analysis, cumulative price of wheat surged by 120 per cent since 2008, far higher than the 40 per cent between 2003 and 2007. it is also many times greater than the international market price increase of 22 per cent for wheat in the same period. Similarly,sugar prices have surged 184 per cent higher since 2008, compared with 46 per cent increase during 2003-07.

Some have attributed this rise in prices to recent flood and global food crisis. Yet some relate this price increase to poor harvest and strong demand from emerging economies.

This food inflation is a cause of concern for the policy makers and it is suggested that underlying the sudden, volatile uprising in Egypt and Tunisia is a growing global crisis sparked by soaring food prices.

Here is an excerpt from an article that throws flood light on to the causes of food price escalation.

The cause of the recent jump in global food prices remains a matter of debate. Some analysts blame the Federal Reserve’s “quantitative easing” program (increasing the money supply with credit created with accounting entries), which they warn is sparking hyperinflation. Too much money chasing too few goods is the classic explanation for rising prices.

The problem with that theory is that the global money supply has actually shrunk since 2006, when food prices began their dramatic rise. Virtually all money today is created on the books of banks as “credit” or “debt,” and overall lending has shrunk. This has occurred in an accelerating process of deleveraging (paying down or writing off loans and not making new ones), as the subprime housing market has collapsed and bank capital requirements have been raised. Although it seems counterintuitive, the more debt there is, the more money there is in the system. As debt shrinks, the money supply shrinks in tandem.

That is why government debt today is not actually the bugaboo it is being made out to be by the deficit terrorists. The flipside of debt is credit, and businesses run on it. When credit collapses, trade collapses. When private debt shrinks, public debt must therefore step in to replace it. The “good” credit or debt is the kind used for building infrastructure and other productive capacity, increasing the Gross Domestic Product and wages; and this is the kind governments are in a position to employ. The parasitic forms of credit or debt are the gamblers’ money-making-money schemes, which add nothing to GDP.

Prices have been driven up by too much money chasing too few goods, but the money is chasing only certain selected goods. Food and fuel prices are up, but housing prices are down. The net result is that overall price inflation remains low.

While quantitative easing may not be the culprit, Fed action has driven the rush into commodities. In response to the banking crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve dropped the Fed funds rate (the rate at which banks borrow from each other) nearly to zero. This has allowed banks and their customers to borrow in the U.S. at very low rates and invest abroad for higher returns, creating a dollar “carry trade.”

Meanwhile, interest rates on federal securities were also driven to very low levels, leaving investors without that safe, stable option for funding their retirements. “Hot money” – investment seeking higher returns – fled from the collapsed housing market into anything but the dollar, which generally meant fleeing into commodities.

At one time food was considered a poor speculative investment, because it was too perishable to be stored until market conditions were right for resale. But that changed with the development of ETFs (exchange-traded funds) and other financial innovations.

As first devised, speculation in food futures was fairly innocuous, since when the contract expired, somebody actually had to buy the product at the “spot” or cash price. This forced the fanciful futures price and the more realistic spot price into alignment. But that changed in 1991. In a revealing July 2010 report in Harper’s Magazine titled “The Food Bubble: How Wall Street Starved Millions and Got Away with It,” Frederick Kaufman wrote:

The history of food took an ominous turn in 1991, at a time when no one was paying much attention. That was the year Goldman Sachs decided our daily bread might make an excellent investment. . . .

Robber barons, gold bugs, and financiers of every stripe had long dreamed of controlling all of something everybody needed or desired, then holding back the supply as demand drove up prices.

Monday, January 10, 2011

EMH and Financial Bubbles

From the starting point of rational investors came the idea of the efficient market hypothesis, a theory first elucidated by my colleague and golfing buddy Gene Fama. The EMH has two components that I call “The Price is Right” and “No Free Lunch”. The price is right principle says asset prices will, to use Mr Fama’s words “fully reflect” available information, and thus “provide accurate signals for resource allocation”. The no free lunch principle is that market prices are impossible to predict and so it is hard for any investor to beat the market after taking risk into account.

In the world of the EMH, as it is known, bubbles are nothing to seriously worry about because prices cannot deviate from proper valuations for too long.

In economics, the invisible hand, also known as the invisible hand of the market, is the term economists use to describe the self-regulating nature of the marketplace. This is a metaphor first coined by the economist Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and used a total of three times in his writings. For Smith, the invisible hand was created by the conjunction of the forces of self-interest, competition, and supply and demand, which he noted as being capable of allocating resources in society. This is the founding justification for the laissez-faire economic philosophy.

But what if that invisible hand is working in its own interest rather than for the interest of all the participants in the market.

Can Goldman Sachs, the profit-seeking missile of high finance, really make money by investing $450 million in Facebook, at a vertigo-inducing price that values the social-networking company at $50 billion? Facebook’s shares were said to be trading on a private-market exchange at a valuation of $42.4 billion. Thanks to Goldman’s imprimatur, Facebook’s value increased 20 percent virtually overnight. Can Goldman really expect to squeeze more water from this stone? Sadly, yes. To understand why, we have to go to the heart of the many problems in the way the Wall Street cartel does business, despite the promised reforms of the Dodd-Frank law. With Goldman’s investment in Facebook, we have a front-row seat to the process by which Wall Street creates and inflates financial bubbles. Goldman has almost certainly locked up the role of lead manager of the inevitable Facebook initial public offering. Fees for underwriting public offerings are generally about 7 percent of the value of the stock sold. Facebook could easily sell $2 billion of stock or more, generating fees to Goldman and the other underwriters of at least $140 million. The other benefit for Goldman in leading the public offering — aside from major bragging rights — is that it can use its marketing, sales and distribution muscle to make sure the value of Facebook at the time of the offering exceeds the $50 billion valuation at which Goldman invested.

It seems that Goldman has set up a "special purpose vehicle" and alerted top clients that through this SPV they will have the opportunity to invest in an as-yet-unnamed company, which reportedly is Facebook. The way this looks to Felix Salmon over at Reuters, and his explanation makes a lot of sense to me, is that this SPV is potentially a way around SEC reporting requirements for publicly-traded companies. But to me this just looks like a funky retro take on many of the IPO scams of the late nineties and early 2000s, where the investment bank sucks in herds of overstimulated investors, hides the true value of the firm in question from everyone, and then roasts the whole cattle-crowd of wealth-seekers to a crisp through fees and commissions and hidden markups. Back then the carrot was a wave of excited news-media coverage about the "new paradigm" that was going to make financial behemoths out of every online university for dogs or web-based dental floss warehouse that came up the IPO pipeline. This time around it's fantasies like the notion that Facebook is somehow worth fifty billion dollars (it's been interesting to watch which news outlets credulously report that figure).

The first thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs is that it's everywhere. The world's most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money. In fact, the history of the recent financial crisis, which doubles as a history of the rapid decline and fall of the suddenly swindled dry American empire, reads like a Who's Who of Goldman Sachs graduates. The bank's unprecedented reach and power have enabled it to turn all of America into a giant pump-and-dump scam, manipulating whole economic sectors for years at a time, moving the dice game as this or that market collapses, and all the time gorging itself on the unseen costs that are breaking families everywhere — high gas prices, rising consumer credit rates, half-eaten pension funds, mass layoffs, future taxes to pay off bailouts. All that money that you're losing, it's going somewhere, and in both a literal and a figurative sense, Goldman Sachs is where it's going: The bank is a huge, highly sophisticated engine for converting the useful, deployed wealth of society into the least useful, most wasteful and insoluble substance on Earth — pure profit for rich individuals. They achieve this using the same playbook over and over again. The formula is relatively simple: Goldman positions itself in the middle of a speculative bubble, selling investments they know are crap. Then they hoover up vast sums from the middle and lower floors of society with the aid of a crippled and corrupt state that allows it to rewrite the rules in exchange for the relative pennies the bank throws at political patronage. Finally, when it all goes bust, leaving millions of ordinary citizens broke and starving, they begin the entire process over again, riding in to rescue us all by lending us back our own money at interest, selling themselves as men above greed, just a bunch of really smart guys keeping the wheels greased. They've been pulling this same stunt over and over since the 1920s — and now they're preparing to do it again, creating what may be the biggest and most audacious bubble yet.If you want to understand how we got into this financial crisis, you have to first understand where all the money went — and in order to understand that, you need to understand what Goldman has already gotten away with. It is a history exactly five bubbles long — including last year's strange and seemingly inexplicable spike in the price of oil. There were a lot of losers in each of those bubbles, and in the bailout that followed. But Goldman wasn't one of them.

Financial institutions that are large in absolute size may have deep and well-filled with which they can among other things hire lobbyists, support individual political parties and election candidates, and, under the recent Supreme Court reinterpretation of the U.S. Constitution's first amendment, mount advertising campaigns in direct support of or opposition to election candidates.  In Federalist Paper No. 10, James Medison warned against the political power of factions resulting from "the verious and unequal distribution of property" ... " who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."

Here I offer only one additional strand of historical evidence ‐‐ Figure 1, drawn by artist Joseph Keppler for Puck magazine, January 23, 1889 ‐ a year before the Sherman Act was passed. 

Monopoly

One cannot view it without recognizing that the U.S. public was alarmed at the time about the political power of the great trusts, for which we might now substitute bloated figures for JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs.  It would be hard to deny that public concerns over the trusts' power in federal and state legislatures were an important stimulus to the Sherman Act's passage.   And now, 120 years later, there is abundant reason to fear the enormous political power of the financial institutions, said by one writer to own Washington "lock, stock, and barrel."   In 2008, for example, the finance lobby is said to have contributed $475 million to political candidates and their supporting party organizations ‐ more than twice the level of contributions from the second largest lobby, the health care industry.

Monday, January 3, 2011

Financial Crisis and Academic Conflict of Interest

Islam prohibits a behavior that is in conflict of one’s responsibilities. Here is an Aya from Quran and commentary. The Aya and commentary is very relevant to the subject under discussion.

And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities nor use it as bait for the judges with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of (other) people's property. Aya 188 of Sura Al-Baqara

Besides the three primal physical needs of man, which are apt to make him greedy, there is a fourth greed in society, the greed of wealth and property. The purpose of fasts is not completed until this fourth greed is also restrained.
Ordinarily honest men are content if they refrain from robbery, theft, or embezzlement. Two more subtle forms of the greed are mentioned here. One is where one uses one's own property for corrupting others - judges or those in authority - so as to obtain some material gain even under the cover and protection of the law.
The words translated "other people's property may also mean "public property". A still more subtle form is where we use our own property or property under our own control - "among yourselves" in the Text - for vain or frivolous uses. Under the Islamic standard this is also greed. Property carries with it its own responsibilities. If we fail to understand or fulfil them, we have not learnt the full lesson of self-denial by fasts. Commentary By Abdullah Yusuf Ali

Academicians are the forerunners of practitioners. They observe a certain phenomena and try their best to explain it so that behaviors of practitioners can be moulded accordingly for the benefit of public at large. Rules and regulations are the outcome of such observations, empirical analyses, academic debate etc.

In the wake of current financial crisis, there is a need for an unbiased analyses by the academia so that causes for such crises in the future can be controlled. But unfortunately there are some grey areas that need to be addressed like biasness for example. There are growing reports that academia was involved in the financial meltdown.

Here is an excerpt from an article

Over the last thirty years, academic economics has been penetrated by special interests, particularly financial services, in the same way that America’s political and regulatory systems have been compromised by campaign contributions and the revolving door.  In fact, the “revolving door” is now a triangular trip between industry, government, and academia.

Prominent economists are now routinely paid to testify in antitrust cases, criminal trials, and regulatory proceedings; to testify in Congress; to give speeches to the industries and firms they study; to serve on boards of directors and as advisors; and to write supposedly objective analyses of industries, companies and policies. These payments and the conflicts of interest they generate are rarely disclosed, except when required by Federal law.

These activities are not marginal; they are now, literally, a billion dollar industry, managed by firms such as the Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG), The Analysis Group, Compass Lexecon, Charles River Associates, and others.  Professors’ income from such groups often dwarfs their academic salaries.  That neither universities nor most publications require such disclosure was one of the most shocking facts I learned while making Inside Job, my documentary on the financial crisis.

More recently, American Economic Association has recognized this moral hazard and has announced to adopt a code of ethical standards for its members. Following is an excerpt from The New York Times article on the subject.

Academic economists, particularly those active in policy debates in Washington and Wall Street, are facing greater scrutiny of their outside activities these days. Faced with a run of criticism, including a popular movie, leaders of the American Economic Association, the world’s largest professional society for economists, founded in 1885, are considering a step that most other professions took a long time ago — adopting a code of ethical standards.

The proposal, which has not been announced to the public or to the association’s 17,000 members, is partly a response to “Inside Job,” a documentary film released in October that excoriates leading academic economists for their ties to Wall Street as consultants, advisers or corporate directors.

Here is another excerpt from an article

In October, Gerald Epstein and Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth released a paper documenting potential conflicts of interests among academic economists writing about the financial crisis and financial reform. Focusing on the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation and the Pew Economic Policy Group Financial Reform Project, they found that a majority of the economists involved had affiliations with private financial institutions, yet few of them disclosed those affiliations even in academic publications (where they do not face the word constraints imposed by print newspaper editors), preferring to identify themselves by their universities and as members of prestigious institutions such as NBER. To be fair, they did not find a strong relationship between economists’ affiliations and their positions on financial reform, perhaps because of the small sample and the limited amount of variation in the positions of members of these groups.

Following is an excerpt from a letter written by Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth to the president of the AEA asking for the adoption of a code that requires economists to avoid conflicts of interest and to disclose ties that could create the appearance of a conflict of interest.

More specifically we propose that the AEA adopt a code modeled on that of the American Sociological Association. This code could state that: “Economists should maintain the highest degree of integrity in their professional work and avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of conflict. Moreover, economists should disclose relevant sources of financial support and relevant personal or professional relationships that may have the appearance or potential for a conflict of interest in public speeches and writing, as well as in academic publications.”

This issue has taken on greater salience as the recent financial crisis has highlighted economists’ potentially conflicting roles that may have affected their real or perceived impartiality as analysts and experts. For example, in an assessment of 19 economists who have played prominent and influential roles in recent public policy debates, Gerald Epstein and Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth found that 13 out of 19 economists had private financial affiliations indicative of some possible conflicts of interest, but only 5 had clearly and publicly revealed their affiliations. A Reuters study of Congressional testimony by academics (many but not all of whom are economists) analyzed “… 96 testimonies given by 82 academics to the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee between late 2008 and early 2010 — as lawmakers debated the biggest overhaul of financial regulation since the 1930s.”  They found that “…roughly a third (of the academics) did not reveal their financial affiliations in their testimonies, based on a comparison of the text of their testimonies available on the Congressional committees’ websites with their resumes available online.”

From reading all the above reports, one can easily get that there is something wrong and under the existing arrangement of academia and financial industry, it is hard to accept that they will come up with some un biased analyses and reforms that are in the interest of the public at large. Unless and until the profession does not enforce transparency and code of ethical standards, ill advised policy is a real danger.

Friday, December 31, 2010

Efficient Market Hypothesis - EMH

EMH is a cornerstone of modern financial theory. EMH asserts that financial markets are "informationally efficient". That is, one cannot consistently achieve returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis, given the information publicly available at the time the investment is made.

But what if there is one big stakeholder who has enough stake to manipulate the market in the direction he wants.

The Wall Street Journal has just reported that in the copper market "a single trader has reported it owns 80% to 90% of the copper sitting in London Metal Exchange warehouses, equal to about half of the world's exchange-registered copper stockpile and worth about $3 billion."

The following reading in the context of above news report and EMH is interesting.

Copper soared to a new record of $4.2705 per pound on Tuesday in New York, and is up 28.3% this year. The LME's three-month copper contract closed at $9,353.50 a metric ton, up 1.6% on the day, a new record.

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. recently had a large position in copper, though it is unclear whether the U.S. bank increased its holdings, or whether a new player has taken dominant position.

"Regardless of who owns it, the only thing of note here is that we are being told that one person has a substantial position," said David Threlkeld, president of Resolved Inc., a metals consultancy.

While commodities exchanges scrutinize all holdings to ensure a single player isn't trying to corner the market, and many of the positions are owned by big firms on behalf of clients, the large holdings do result in a concentration of ownership that could skew prices.

Please keep the bolded text in mind, as you read the following description of the idiocy spewed on TV tonight, via the Street:

"Everything that goes up is not a bubble," Jim Cramer told the viewers of his "Mad Money" TV show Tuesday, as he reminded viewers that the laws of supply and demand have not been replaced by the law of gravity.

Cramer said he's had enough with the skeptics keeping investors from making real money in stocks, and especially in commodities. He said it's OK to be skeptical sometimes, but being skeptical about everything will only hurt your portfolio.
Case in point, the commodities. Cramer said the last big rally in commodities like copper and oil was indeed driven by a hedge fund frenzy, but this time is different.This time, he said, commodities are being driven higher by real demand, by the fact that the world is growing, and there's an inability to find new raw materials fast enough.

In other words: per Cramer, the story broken by the WSJ is just fabulation and JPM's 90% lock of the copper market is as indication of proper supply/demand dynamics. Because, in some parallel universe, JP Morgan controlling 90% of the market is real demand...

You read that right.

Here is another twist to the financial theory.

Here's yet another diabolic cycle for ordinary Americans, engineered by the grifter class. A Pennsylvanian like Robert Lukens sees his business decline thanks to soaring oil prices that have been jacked up by a handful of banks that paid off a few politicians to hand them the right to manipulate the market. Lukens has no say in this; he pays what he has to pay. Some of that money of his goes into the pockets of the banks that disenfranchise him politically, and the rest of it goes increasingly into the pockets of Middle Eastern oil companies. And since he's making less money now, Lukens is paying less in taxes to the state of Pennsylvania, leaving the state in a budget shortfall. Next thing you know, Governor Ed Rendell is traveling to the Middle East, trying to sell the Pennsylvania Turnpike to the same oil states who've been pocketing Bob Lukens's gas dollars. It's an almost frictionless machine for stripping wealth out of the heart of the country, one that perfectly encapsulates where we are as a nation.
When you're trying to sell a highway that was once considered one of your nation's great engineering marvels — 532 miles of hard-built road that required tons of dynamite, wood, and steel and the labor of thousands to bore seven mighty tunnels through the Allegheny Mountains — when you're offering that up to petro-despots just so you can fight off a single-year budget shortfall, just so you can keep the lights on in the state house into the next fiscal year, you've entered a new stage in your societal development.

You know how you used to have a job, and a house, and a car, and a wife and a family, and there was food in the fridge — and now you're six months into a drug habit and you're carrying toasters and TVs out the front door every morning just to raise the cash to make it through that day? That's where we are. While a lot of this book is about how American banks used bubble schemes to strip the last meat off the bones of America's postwar golden years, the cruelest joke is that American banks now don't even have the buying power needed to finish the job of stripping the country completely clean.

So, it is high time that all the assumptions underlying modern financial theory like Banking, Stock Markets, Corporatization, Securitization etc. should be re-visited by honest academics, practitioners.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

MM Theorem and Reality

MM proposition 1 says that value of a firm is independent from its financial structure. If this is the case then the ideal financial structure is 100% debt.
But fortunately this is not the case otherwise everything on the earth might be held by banks as collateral. The reasons for the current scenario is different than advocated by MM are
1. Arbitrage mechanism has its limits.
2. Interest rate on personal debt is different from corporate debt because of underlying collateral, size of debt and remaining borrowing capacity.
3. Borrowing capacity of corporations as well as its shareholders is limited because there is a real cost of bankruptcy.
4. Capital markets are not perfect, there is asymmetry of information between corporations and its capital providers.
5. Interest rate varies with the leverage because of risk of default.
6. There is no “equivalent return” class because the underlying risk is different from firm to firm, which is accumulation of numbers of factors.
7. Firms within the same industry post very different operating income because of difference in strategy pursued.
8. Securities of all firms in the world are not traded on capital markets.

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Sure Win Turnaround Formula

One of the reason for a turnaround of Ford Motors is slashing of debt and reducing interest cost. This is another evidence that debt exert unbearable pressure on companies and bring them down. Here is an excerpt from an article from Economist

That turnaround is impressive (see chart 1). Despite the sluggish recovery in the North American market, in the third quarter Ford’s automotive businesses made an operating profit of $2.1 billion, twice as much as a year before and the fifth quarterly surplus in a row, on revenue of $29 billion. Its net income was a quarterly record of $1.7 billion. Analysts at Morgan Stanley, an investment bank, expect the company to make a profit of $10.5 billion in 2010. In 2009 it made one third of that. Ford has also slashed $12.8 billion off the automotive debt of $33 billion it had at the start of the year. By late November the company reckoned it had lowered its annualised interest costs by nearly $1 billion.

Saturday, October 30, 2010

Efficient Market Hypothesis

Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) - An hypothesis which states that the price of a security is a reflection of all available information about it and thus represents its true value. It states also that the current price of a security is the most appropriate measure of future returns. 


But in real world there is no such thing. Investment bankers, brokers, vested interests all use all the weapons including academia to ensure that people believe in the EMH. Here is an excerpt from an article that makes the point clear.


" We already know that Lehman and other firms used fake accounting to hide liabilities and inflate assets; that lenders and securitizers frequently knew that the loans they sold and packaged were fraudulent or defective; and, of course, we also now know that Goldman Sachs and other investment banks sold securities they knew to be defective (they were often sold to pension funds for low-paid government employees, by the way) -- and that they designed many of these securities so that they could profit by betting against them after they were sold."

Monday, October 18, 2010

Another "Inside Job" Revelation

Business news followers will already be familiar with much of the film's main turf. And, of course, we all now know Alan Greenspan's heinous role in the whole mess. Even close readers may be surprised, however, at some of Ferguson's revelations. I was particularly struck by the complicity of the academic world in providing the intellectual underpinnings for the theories that led us off a cliff (for example: "It's a good idea to deregulate derivatives!")--for money. Larry Summers, Harvard's Martin Feldstein, and Columbia'sGlenn Hubbard come across as particularly culpable.

Friday, October 15, 2010

Intellectual Conflict of Interest

Here is an excerpt from an article by the director of "Inside Job" that throws some light that not all research is done objectively there may be compromises.



Over the past 30 years, the economics discipline has been systematically subverted, in much the same way as American politics - by money, especially from the financial services industry. Many of the most prominent economists in America are now paid to testify in Congress, to serve on boards of directors, testify in antitrust cases and regulatory proceedings, and to give speeches to the companies and industries they study and write about with supposed objectivity. This is not a marginal activity; it is now an industry, run by a half dozen large companies.
Some prominent academics have close ties to financial services yet neither their university employers nor the journals in which they publish require them to disclose their conflicts of interest, their financial positions, or the relationship between their financial interests and the policy positions they take.
It is time to end this. At a minimum, federal law should require public disclosure of all outside income that is in any way related to professors’ publishing and policy advocacy. It may be desirable to go even further, and to limit the total size of outside income that potentially generates conflicts of interest.

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

the justice is “half baked at best,”

An excerpt from Break the Banks



During the last two decades, major U.S. and European banks have paid fines to settle charges of, among other things, accounting fraud (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac), assisting Enron’s fraud (Citigroup, J.P. Morgan), assisting people in tax evasion (UBS), using bribery to sell financial products (J.P. Morgan), money laundering (Citicorp), and fraudulently recommending stocks in exchange for business (10 investment banks in the dotcom era). In paying the fines, none of these banks acknowledged wrongdoing.
Now we’re witnessing another round of this shameful routine. President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. have said they would hold Wall Street accountable for the crash, warning “unscrupulous executives,” in Holder’s words, that “we will investigate you, we will prosecute you, and we will incarcerate you.” But despite fraud on a scale possibly unmatched in history, the Justice Department has not charged a single executive or firm. The Securities and Exchange Commission, meanwhile, has extracted only fines from a handful of big banks. Three of the federal judges who oversaw these cases—none of which included an acknowledgment of guilt—protested from the bench, saying the fines are “not enough to deter anyone from doing anything,” the justice is “half baked at best,” and the banks are getting “a free ride.” (Holder has defended his financial-fraud task force, stressing “the totality” of its efforts, including cases against mortgage fraud and insider trading; SEC chairwoman Mary Schapiro has noted that the bulk of its investigations are “not necessarily” done.) 

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Wealth and Happiness

Here is an excerpt from an article that provided an evidence that money can't bring happiness. It is an illusion. These thoughts are akin to Quranic teachings

Fair in the eyes of men is the love of things they covet: women and sons; heaped-up hoards of gold and silver; horses branded (for blood and excellence); and (wealth of) cattle and well-tilled land. Such are the possessions of this world's life; but in nearness to Allah is the best of the goals (to return to). Say: shall I give you glad tidings of things far better than those? For the righteous are gardens in nearness to their Lord with rivers flowing beneath; therein is their eternal home; with companions pure (and holy) and the good pleasure of Allah. For in Allah's sight are (all) His servants. (Ayat 14-15, Sura Al-i'Imran)

Say: "In the Bounty of Allah and in His Mercy in that let them rejoice": that is better than the (wealth) they hoard. (Aya 58, Sura Yunus)

 

It's a mystery why money doesn't make us happy, because it feels like it damn well should. With money we can buy whatever we want, go wherever we want, even be whoever we want. Surely that should make us happy? 

And yet study after study shows that in affluent societies money might bring satisfaction, but it doesn't bring much happiness.

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Deficit Terrorist at work again

Here is a reproduction of a news item from DAWN



ISLAMABAD, July 12: While the rest of the country was fixated on the face-off between the media and the PML-N, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was provided a reality check last week about the precarious economic situation in the country.
He was warned by the finance ministry that with the fiscal deficit touching 6.2 per cent of GDP (Rs925 billion) last year, the government ran the risk of IMF backing out unless it earned Rs500 billion through additional revenue or reduce its expenditures drastically during the current fiscal year.
More serious still, he was informed that the only way of controlling expenditures was to ask the provinces not to exercise their powers to raise additional funds under the new NFC award.
This was the gist of the message hammered home during a presentation by Finance Minister Dr Abdul Hafeez Shaikh and his team to the prime minister during his visit to the ministry.
A major headache in this regard, Dawn has learnt, is the overall fiscal situation which can deteriorate because of inter-corporation circular debt. This, according to the finance ministry’s estimates, will take a 25-30 per cent hike in electricity tariff during the current financial year to breakeven on this count.
However, what makes this crisis unpredictable is that an increase in international oil prices or Pakistan’s failure to produce estimated amount of gas and hydel energy (which would mean more thermal energy and hence more oil) can push these numbers higher.
No wonder then that the World Bank and the IMF, sources told Dawn, had estimated a 49 per cent increase in electricity rates.
As a result, the government has no choice but to check its spending and improve revenue collection. The prime minister was informed that the government had exhibited little fiscal responsibility and failed to limit debt for the third year running because of financial indiscipline by the provincial governments.
Hafeez Sheikh and his team pointed out that the provincial governments, which were expected to provide a surplus of about 0.6 per cent of GDP during the last financial year, ended up with deficits.
The Punjab government closed its accounts with a Rs38 billion deficit, followed by Sindh at Rs27 billion and Balochistan Rs7 billion.
As a result, the provincial governments together contributed about one per cent to the overall fiscal deficit of 6.2 per cent instead of helping to meet the 5.1 per cent target agreed with the IMF.
The prime minister was also informed that Federal Board of Revenue had missed the revenue collection target by about Rs70 billion, excluding over Rs50 billion of refunds. The total revenue shortfall, therefore, remained in excess of Rs120 billion. If the refunds were also excluded, the fiscal deficit could be close to Rs1,000 billion.
MORE BAD NEWS: The bad news for the prime minis ter did not end here. He was informed that the economic situation could further worsen because of the strong parliamentary opposition to the value-added tax (VAT).
The reformed general sales tax could also face practical and administrative hiccups in case the Sindh government did not drop it insistence on collecting the tax on services.
And if the government fails to introduce the uniform reformed GST across the country, it should stop counting on the IMF programme under which more than $2 billion is still to be transferred to Pakistan. As a consequence, the country will not be able to get bilateral and multilateral financial support, increasing the chances of a default.
Mr Gilani was told that if the government wanted to avoid this situation it would have to persuade the provincial governments to check expenditures and prepare themselves for additional revenue generation. The problem the government may face is that the finance ministry cannot rein in the provinces and force them to spend less or to reduce their federal transfers in view of a consensus NFC award.
Therefore, the prime minister had been requested to persuade the provinces to limit their spending to the last year’s level, notwithstanding additional shares they had thanks to the new NFC award to generate a surplus of at least 1.5 per cent of GDP (which translates to about Rs170 billion), the sources said.
According to the sources, the prime minister assured the finance ministry officials that he would raise the matter with chief ministers on Tuesday.
TOP


It seems that these terrorists are developing their arguments for the total surrender of our autonomy, whatsoever is left, to IMF. To me this deficit and its consequences can be taken as a blessing in disguise as we, the masses, shall not be taking another burden of $2 billion that the IMF has yet to disburse. We all including the so called Servants of the country have to face the stark reality of living within our means so there would be automatic cut in expenditures, no need to worry about increasing trend in expenditures. As the saying goes " Necessity is the mother of invention", when there will be acute shortage of electricity on numbers of accounts, people will find a way to out of this seemingly impossible obstacle. And this necessity shall not be only in electricity but shall be everywhere and when you put the brains of some 200 million people on innovation, then everything and anything is possible. Moreover, we, the masses, shall be relieved of the rampant corruption as Muslims we have faith in Allah (SWT) that He is the One who has all answers to our miseries and as we have shown time and again that in adversity we turn toward Him for help and we then behave or try to behave as closely as possible as Allah (SWT) has ordained.

So, default and save the country from the plunderers.

Thursday, July 8, 2010

Capital Structure and Its Determinants

Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1991) in their paper "The Theory of Capital Structure" identified four categories of factors that are responsible for determination of capital structure of a firm. These factors or as they put it "desires" are

  • ameliorate conflicts of interest among various groups with claims to  the firm's resources,  including managers (the agency approach), 
  • convey private  information  to capital markets or mitigate adverse selection effects  (the asymmetric  information approach), 
  • influence  the  nature  of  products  or  competition  in  the  product/input market, or 
  • affect the outcome of corporate control contests. 
The theories that it is to "ameliorate conflict of interest" and "affect the outcome of corporate control contests" have nothing to do with the basic purpose of the firm - to create value for stakeholders - and in all probability, these are satanic designs that ruin the firm in the end. If all the stakeholders are working according to the well defined norms of justice and fair play than why there is conflict of interest? The theory of Capital Structure to avoid agency costs that Jensen and Meckling identified lead the managers on the path of destruction since the managers are given incentives such as based on EVA etc. and managers when faced with -ve results try to manipulate the earnings in order to achieve the target and earn incentives, the examples are "Enron", "Worldcom", etc. Debt provides incentive to engage in suboptimal investment because  in debt  contract  there is an implicit provision  that  if  an  investment  yields  large returns, well  above  the face value of the debt, equityholders capture most of the  gain.  If,  however,  the  investment  fails,  because  of  limited  liability, debtholders  bear  the  consequences in case liquidation is insufficient to cover the entire amount of debt. So clever managers who would like to hold on to power would go for the higher debt equity ratio and this is the strategy that comes to mind immediately there is any threat of take over. But that is a dangerous path to move on because debt has to be paid at some fixed time in future and that future is highly uncertain. Uncertainty coupled with fixed nature of debt commitment puts the managers under pressure for results and that is where the best laid out plans fall apart and lead the managers to play games.

The theory that capital structure decison is to convey inside / private information to market means it is used / can be used as a deception. Why can't we convey inside information in a straight forward manner without taking any steps that can lead the firm on the road to destruction? If the answer is no, then something is wrong that is being dragged under the rug. Information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders cause different value for the firms' assets and that may result in financing a new project / investment opportunity by existing owners / managers with debt if internal fund are insufficient - pecking order theory of capital structure. This pecking order begins when outsiders have some serious doubts about the information not available to them and that makes them suspicious. The question is why such asymmetry of information in the first place? Market, it seems always thinks of the information asymmetry that is why  "Noe shows that the average quality of  firms  issuing  debt  is  higher  in  equilibrium  than  that  of  firms  issuing equity.  Therefore,  like Myers-Majluf,  Noe's model  predicts  a  negative  stock market response to an announcement of an equity issue. Noe  also predicts a positive  market  response  to  an  announcement  of  a  debt  issue." There is always mistrust of managers by the market about firm's inside information. Why can't insiders speak the truth? Or why can't market take the words of insiders to be true on its face value unless otherwise proved? Is there lack of trust or lack of reputation? Because of lack of trust and distortion of communication between management and market, the market tends to heavily tilted towards the debt, which promises a fixed return irrespective of any reference to profit / (loss) - a figure that is highly questionable from the point of view of the outsiders for numbers of reasons but mainly on account of asymmetry of information. 

Leverage changes the behavior of the firm and its strategy because a levered firm assumes a sure commitment of periodic fixed payment to debtholders to remain in business. In the face of debt, it is very difficult to sustain high quality. Because quality can only be achieved through truth - speaking truth about its systems, products, people and speaking truth to its suppliers, customers, but when a firm has a debt to pay its ability to speak truth is highly undermined. This is even more true in case of an adverse forecast or less than expected results then the deviations from the straight path take start. All information asymmetries, conflicts of interests, contests for control of firm and competitive strategies move in different directions than the relevant theoretical models predict. 

Saturday, June 26, 2010

Capital Structure Decision and Firm Value

According to famous MM proposition I, value of the firm is independent of its capital structure - firm value is invariant to its financial structure. They proved this proposition mathematically. Intuitively this proposition hold value. Valuation of a firm is a function of its expected earnings over time capitalized at an appropriate rate for its given risk class. Critics, however, are ready to point out that value of the firm can be increased by taking tax advantage of debt, which has been rejected by the MM by going over the investors' side and taking help from personal Income Tax. The value maximization criticism can't be overruled as a firm's net after tax cash inflow to firm increase with the addition of debt in the capital structure. 

Inherent in the discussion on capital structure decision is that EBIT of a firm is independent of its financing structure. Expected earnings are a function of assets' earning capacity and its productivity and this has nothing to do with how the assets are financed. But "DEBT is as powerful a drug as alcohol and nicotine. In boom times Western consumers used it to enhance their lifestyles,companies borrowed to expand their businesses and investors employed debt to enhance their returns." Can we say that inclusion of debt in capital structure is synonymous to introduction to a healthy person "drug and alcohol"? In the words of Hyman Minsky, an American economist "these debt crises were both inherent in the capitalist system and cyclical. Prosperous times encourage individuals and companies to take on more risk, meaning more debt. Initially such speculation is successful and encourages others to follow suit; eventually credit is extended to those who will be able to repay the debt only if asset prices keep rising (a succinct description of the subprime-lending boom). In the end the pyramid collapses." 

The problem with debt is that it needs to repay it. That is where the problem starts. The need to repay something in future and future is a t the very best is a mere guess - uncertain. This compulsory payment in future coupled with uncertainty about future is the root cause of the problem that needs to be probed into and analysed thoroughly. A firm which has future obligations for payment must meet the minimum necessary to honor its commitments. In the words of Merton H. Miller "The firm pays  its debts not just  because the  law says it must, but because the value of  the stock to  its shareholders is  greater  to  them  if  the  firm  pays  the  debts  than  if  it  doesn't." So  to remain on the same level of value before inclusion of debt in the capital structure, a firm has to honor its commitment to pay the debt obligation and has to earn a minimum to honor that commitment. This compulsory or mandatory nature of target puts some kind of an extra pressure on the levered firm as compared to unlevered firm. Because of that extra pressure, the EBIT of a levered firm may be different than an unlevered firm keeping everything else same.